Israel vs Iran wargame compendium

Given Paul’s last post on Persian Incursion, I thought it might be useful to pull together a summary of recent serious wargames regarding a potential Israeli (or US) strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. For obvious reasons, this list only includes those games that are in the public domain. If I’ve missed anything, feel free to add additional references in the comments.

Kennedy School of Government/Belfer Center, Harvard University (December 2009)

• report at Haaretz
• report by David Ignatius at Washington Post
• report by Stephen Walt at Foreign Policy magazine
• report by Gary Sick at The National
• report by Laura Rozen at Politico
• report at PAXsims

Reported outcome: No attack, with the US unwilling (and pressuring Israel not to), and Russia and China opposed. Iran continues existing program.

Comment: Walt offers some critical thoughts on the game’s design, and the implications of those shortcomings for its external validity.

Brookings Institution (December 2009)

• report by Kenneth Pollack at Brookings
• report at New York Times
• report by Laura Rozen at Politico
• report at PAXsims
• Karim Sadjadpour at Foreign Policy magazine
• report at PAXsims (links to above)

Reported outcome: Israel attacks, US urges restraint, Iran retaliates (against Israel, Saudi Arabia and European targets, but not US), Hizbullah and Hamas join Iranian retaliation, Israel launches larger campaign, Iran attempts to interdict Gulf oil exports, US reinforces military positions in the Gulf. 

Comment: The initial military scenario, which involves Israel establishing temporary airstrips for refuelling its strike missions on Saudi soil without Saudi permission seems particularly unrealistic. Modern high performance combat aircraft don’t take well to operating on rough desert landing strips, Saudi ISR and interception capacities are far from negligible, there’s very little topographical cover or radar shadow in northern Arabian, and—whatever its support for a strike against Iran—Riyadh would be outraged if its soil were used for the purpose. It would be a disaster waiting to happen. Hamas retaliation at Iran’s behest is pretty unrealistic too.

Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv University (c December 2009)

• report at Haaretz (via Reuters)
• report as PAXsims (links to above)
• another report at PAXsims (links to INSS report)

Reported outcome: Israel conducted limited special forces operation as “warning shot,” but US opposes full strike. Iran continues existing program, but considers negotiations.

 Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya (May 2010)

• report at Jerusalem Post
• IDF report
• report at PAXsims (links to both of above)

Reported outcome: Iran goes nuclear, Hizbullah attacks Israel (and receives materials for dirty bomb), Israel considers retaliation, UNSC demands Lebanon disarm Hizbullah, US forms “coalition of the willing” to intervene in Lebanon against Hizbullah.

Comment: Lots of worst cases strung in a row.

Michael Peck, Persian Incursion (November 2011)

• Michael Peck report at Foreign Policy magazine
• Michael Peck report at Wired’s Danger Room
• report at PAXsims (comments, links to above)
• NPR report

Reported outcome: Israel attacks, Iran responds with missile strike of limited effectiveness, Israeli strikes and tit-for-tat continue.

Comment: Michael notes that Iranian retaliatory options (against non-Israeli targets, or using allies and proxies) are limited by the game design. 

See also: Brant Guillory’s video report on a modified game of Persian Incursion (with additional fog of war) at Origins War College (via BGG)

UPDATE (1 January 2012):

Since posting this, I’ve also come across a 2006-07 simulation and modelling exercise by the Heritage Foundation that looked at the consequences of a short-term Iranian closure of the Straits of Hormuz following a US strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities. In the first run closure had significant economic effects, including an $85/barrel increase in oil prices and a $161 billion hit to US GDP. In the second run these effects were mitigated by a variety of US policy responses (some of which—like relaxing environmental regulations—seemed to have more to do with the Heritage Foundation’s generic policy preferences than managing the short- and medium-term effects of managing a spike in world oil prices).

UPDATE (10 January 2012):

Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, University of Kentucky (March 2010)

• summary at Information Dissemination
• report in the Kentucky Kernel

Reported outcome: Israel conducts air strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran retaliates with limited ballistic missile attack on Israel. Iran pressures Hizbullah and Hamas to attack israel, but they are reluctant to do so. Iran generally plays it cool (and it is criticized by domestic opposition for inaction). US presses for ceasefire, but Israel decides to launch second strike anyway, resulting in (accidental?) US shoot-down of an Israeli F-16 over Iraq.

Comment: While US shoot-down of an IAF aircraft is very unlikely, the prospect of a calm Iran playing an israeli strike for diplomatic gains is an interesting one. 

Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv University (October 2011)

• INSS summary
• full INSS report
• report at The Australian (from The Times)
• report by AFP

Reported outcome: Iran tests a nuclear weapon in 2013, and grows more assertive in the region, including low-level attacks against US vessels and demands for changes in the border with Iraq. US urges Israeli restraint. Saudi Arabia develops its own nuclear program. Egypt proposes military action against Iran. Turkey is cautious, and considers withdrawing from NATO if Israel joins.

Comments: I am unconvinced that a (presumably) Muslim Brotherhood-led Egyptian government pushing military action against Iran, notwithstanding Gulf preferences or Sunni/Shiite differences. NATO expansion to include Israel seems deeply unlikely barring resolution of the Palestinian issue. It isn’t clear why Iran would want to undermine its allies in Iraq. However, Saudi behaviour rings true. I wonder what they assumed about Syria in 2013-continuing Iranian friend or post-Ba’thist foe?